Sexual Abuser Insurance in Alaska:
A Note on St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. EH.; K.W*
This Note discusses the insurability of acts of sexual abuse as
raised in the recent Ninth Circuitcase of St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. F.H.; K.W. After reviewing the facts of St. Paul
Fire, the Note discussesAlaska's law on the issues of insurability
of intentionalacts in general and whether sexual abuse can ever
be within the scope of employment. The Note then compares
Alaska's law to that of other states. Finally,the Note analyzes the
Ninth Circuit's decision in St. Paul Fire and concludes that
although sexual abuser insurance currently exists in Alaska as a
result of this case, Alaska's courts should reject this policy when
they next consider the issue.
I.

INTRODUCrION

K.W. was sexually abused for three years by the executive
director of Big Brothers and Big Sisters of Alaska ("Big Brothers").' Big Brothers's insurance company sought a declaratory
judgment that the professional liability policy it had issued to Big
Brothers did not cover the executive director's acts of sexual
abuse.2 In 1995, without any guidance from Alaska's courts, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that
insurance
for acts of sexual abuse is not against Alaska's public
3
policy.
Insurance is generally not available to cover an individual's
own intentional acts.' Sexual abuse is an intentional act and is
Copyright © by Alaska Law Review
* 55 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 674 (1995). Note that the
name of the boy and his guardian are omitted to preserve confidentiality.
1. Id. at 1421.
2. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.H., No. A90-042 Civ. (D. Alaska July
13, 1993).
3. St. Paul Fire, 55 F.3d at 1425.
4. See, e.g., Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d
692,704 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Cal. Ins. Code § 533 (West 1994)) (reflecting
the "fundamental public policy of denying coverage for willful wrongs"); Atlantic
Employers Ins. Co. v. Chartwell Manor Sch., 655 A.2d 954, 957 (NJ. Super. Ct.
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therefore generally considered uninsurable.5 Although Alaska's
courts have never specifically addressed this issue, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Big Brothers's insurance company was
financially liable for damages caused by the executive director's
intentional acts of sexual abuse.6
After a brief look at the facts of St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. RH.; KW.7 , this Note outlines the state of Alaska
law prior to that decision. Because Alaska's law on the insurability
of acts of sexual abuse is virtually nonexistent, this section of the
Note will focus on rulings in two main areas that hint at the
direction in which Alaska law had been moving. First, although the
law is sparse, Alaska had considered the insurability of intentional
acts as a class.' Second, Alaska had considered whether it is
possible to abuse someone sexually without exceeding the scope of
one's employment.' Most of the law in this area focuses on the
issue of respondeat superior liability." After considering the law
as it stood in Alaska, this Note will compare Alaska's law to the
law in other states. The Note will then appraise the Ninth Circuit's
decision in St. Paul Fire and consider issues of public policy.
II. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
Kenneth McQuade was employed as the executive director for
Big Brothers when he began to sexually abuse K.W., one of the
children in the program." One of McQuade's duties as executive

App. Div. 1995) (stating that intentional acts are normally not covered by
insurance as a matter of public policy); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Martin,
660 A.2d 66, 68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), appeal denied, 678 A.2d 366 (Pa. 1996)
(stating it is against public policy to provide insurance coverage for intentional
acts).

5. See, eg., St. Paul Ins. Co. v.Cromeans, 771 F. Supp. 349,352-53 (N.D. Ala.

1991) (noting that all contracts insuring against damage from sexual misconduct

are void as against public policy under applicable Alabama law); Horace Mann
Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 801 (Cal. 1993) (Baxter, J., concurring)
(holding that public policy prohibits an insurer from providing coverage for
injuries resulting from the sexual molestation of a child); Smith v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 447 S.E.2d 255, 257 (W. Va. 1994) (noting that most courts deny liability
insurance coverage for alleged sexual misconduct).
6. St. Paul Fire, 55 F.3d at 1425.
7. 55 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1995).
8. See, e.g., Atlas Assurance Co. of Am. v. Mistic, 822 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1991)
(holding that an arsonist cannot recover on his fire insurance policy as a matter
of public policy).
9. See, e.g., Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990).
10. Id.
11. St. Paul Fire, 55 F.3d at 1421.
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director was to match the volunteer "big brothers" and "big sisters"
with the boys and girls in the program.' McQuade matched
himself with K.W. as the boy's "big brother."' McQuade continued his abuse of K.W. for three years, until he was arrested in
1986. 4
The boy's mother, F.H., brought a civil action against McQuade and Big Brothers in Alaska Superior Court in 1986.' The
superior court granted partial summary judgment to Big Brothers,
holding that the organization was not liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for McQuade's acts of sexual abuse.'6 RH.
settled the claims against Big Brothers and dismissed them from
the litigation.' 7 EH.later settled with McQuade for an amount
in excess of one million dollars." Under the settlement agreement, FH. and K.W. agreed not to enforce the monetary settlement against McQuade in return for his assignment of any rights he
had against St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company as a result
of his sexual abuse liability. 9

St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company had issued a
professional liability insurance policy to Big Brothers that stated
that "[t]he named insured shall include any individual or organization named in this coverage summary. It also includes any partner,
executive officer, director, stockholder or employee working for
you within the scope oftheir duties."''2 The policy also added an
exclusion stating that "[t]here is no coverage for the individual Big
Brother and Big Sister if the event is in violation of any federal,
state, or local law."'" Finally, the policy added another exclusion
within the criminal acts exclusion, stating that "[t]his specific
exclusion of violations of law does not apply to other insureds
named in this agreement."'
Basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship, St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. sought a declaratory judgment in the United
States District Court for the District of Alaska that the policy it
issued to Big Brothers did not cover McQuade for the sexual abuse
12. Id.

13. Id.

14. IM.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

20. Reply Brief of Appellants at 9, St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.H., 55
F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-35746).

21. Id. at 9-10.
22. Id. at 10.
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of K.W.' The district court believed that Alaska law was unclear
on the issue of coverage and attempted certification to the Alaska
Supreme Court under Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 407, but
the supreme court declined to respond.'
The district court granted St. Paul Fire's motion, citing its own
1987 decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Roelfs in finding that
"it is against Alaska's public policy to permit a person to be
insured against a claim of sexual abuse.,2 6 The district court
reasoned that "[lit is possible that the Alaska Supreme Court
considered Roelfs when it decided that Alaska law was sufficiently
clear on the certified issues that further elucidation was not
required."'27 F.H. and K.W. appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.'
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Alaska Law Prior to St. Paul Fire
Alaska law on insurance coverage for intentional acts is sparse,
and Alaska law on insurance coverage for sexual abuse is essentially nonexistent. As one of the main issues in St. Paul Fire is
whether sexual abuse can occur within the scope of employment,
much of the relevant law in Alaska involves respondeat superior
liability, which also depends on what actions are considered to be
within the scope of employment.29
The Alaska Supreme Court addressed the issue of allowing
insurance coverage for intentional acts in Atlas Assurance Co. of
America v. Mistic.30 The case involved a woman whose husband
burned down a house that they shared as tenants in common and
whether she could receive any compensation under the fire
insurance policy in which they were named as co-insureds 3 ' The

23. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.H., No. A90-042 Civ. (D. Alaska July

13, 1993).
24. Id.
25. 698 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1987).
26. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.H., No. A90-042 Civ. (D. Alaska July
13, 1993).
27. Id. at 2 n.2.
28. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.H., 55 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 674 (1995).
29. See, e.g., Williams v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 650 P.2d 343 (Alaska
1982); Luth v. Rogers & Babler Construction Co., 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973);
Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972).
30. 822 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1991).
31. Id. at 898.
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Alaska Supreme Court held that when the insured intentionally
burned down the house, the innocent co-insured was entitled to
recover some portion of proceeds unless the policy had a clear
exclusion for intentional acts 2 However, the court noted that
public policy dictates that an insured who intentionally sets fire to
property covered by the insurance policy may not recover under
the policy:3 Perhaps more importantly, the court also noted that
"[w]here policy language clearly precludes recovery if any of the
co-insureds wrongfully cause the loss, the courts will deny recovery
[even] to an innocent co-insured."'34 In this case, however, Atlas
conceded that it was not clear from the language of the policy
whether Mistic was precluded from recovery
Although Alaska's courts have not specifically addressed the
question of allowing insurance for one's acts of sexual abuse, the
Alaska Supreme Court has considered whether sexual abuse can
occur within the scope of employment. In Doe v. Samaritan
Counseling Center,36 a patient sought to hold a counseling center
liable under respondeat superior for sexual acts of one of its
therapists.37 The therapist had allegedly kissed and fondled Doe
during two of her sessions. 8 Doe canceled her counseling sessions, but she alleged that she and her former therapist continued
to meet outside the office for about a month, until sexual intercourse occurred.39

The supreme court ruled that respondeat superior liability on
the part of the clinic was not precluded simply because the
employee's alleged acts were sexual, and that the time and place of
the alleged conduct was sufficiently related to the employee's work
to allow respondeat superior liability.4 In so holding, the court
diverged from its analysis in previous cases of respondeat superior
liability 4 ' and "significantly expanded the boundaries of an
employer's vicarious liability under Alaska common law."'4

32. Il at 899.
33. Id.

34. Id. at 900.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990).
Id. at 345.
Id.

39. Id.
40. Id. at 348-49.
41. See Luth v. Rogers & Babler Construction Co., 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska
1973); Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972).
42. Cliona Mary Robb, Note, Bad SamaritansMake DangerousPrecedent: The
Perils of Holding an Employer Liable for an Employee's Sexual Misconduct, 8
ALAsKA L. REv. 181 (1991).
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The court in Samaritan acknowledged the general rule that
"[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer will be
held liable for the tort of its employee [only] if the employee's act
was committed within the 'scope of the employment,"'43 but it
added that "[w]hile most authorities concur with this basic
principle, there is disagreement
over the meaning of the term
'scope of employment.' 44 The court referenced a line of Alaska
cases beginning in 1972 that sought to define the term. 5
In Fruitv. Schreiner,46 the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the
traditional "control theory," which limits the employer's liability to
acts that the employee "committed with the implied authority,
acquiescence or subsequent ratification of the employer," 47 and
adopted instead the "enterrise theory," which essentially uses a
"motivation to serve" test. The court found that a trip by an
insurance salesman to socialize with other insurance salesmen
during a sales convention might have been at least partially
motivated by the salesman's desire to improve his own sales skills,
thus benefitting his employer.49 Respondeat superior liability
might therefore be appropriate for injuries inflicted by the
salesman's automobile accident while en route.0
Interestingly, the Fruit court seemed specifically to disallow
respondeat superior liability (i.e., finding an act within the scope of
one's employment) for intentional acts. The court noted that "[t]he
rule of respondeat superior.., is limited to requiring an enterprise
to bear the loss incurred as a result of the employee's negligence."'" The court further noted that to find an act within the
scope of one's duties, "[t]he acts of the employee need be so

43. Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 346 (Alaska 1990).
44. Md

45. Md (citing Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972); Luth v. Rogers
& Babler Construction Co., 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973); Williams v. Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co., 650 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1982)).
46. 502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972).
47. Id. at 140.
48. The court focuses on the benefit conferred by the employee to the
employer rather than using the term "motivation to serve," but describes a
situation in which liability arises through the work the "'servant was employed to
do' and "from the relationship of the enterprise to society rather than from...
misfeasance on the part of the employer." Id. (quoting Young B. Smith, Frolic &
Detour, 23 COL. L. RnEV. 716, 717 (1923)). See Robb, supra note 42, at 186, for
additional support that this amounts to a "motivation to serve" test.
49. Fruit, 502 P.2d at 142.
50. Id
51. Id.at 141 (emphasis added).
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connected to his employtment as to justify requiring that the
employer bear that loss."' 2
One year after Fruit, the Alaska Supreme Court again
addressed the definition of "scope of employment" in Luth v.
Rogers & Babler Construction Co.53 Luth involved another
automobile accident, this one occurring while the employee was
returning home from a work site about twenty-five miles away.5 4
The Luth court noted that Fruit had adopted the "enterprise
theory" without rejecting the criteria of the Restatement (Second)
of Agency
More importantly, the Luth court specifically listed the factors
that it considered important in finding vicarious liability.56 The
court noted that the definition of "'scope of employment' has long
been tied to the employer's right to control the employee's activity
at the time of his tortious conduct,"' but acknowledged that while
control is a factor in determining whether the employee's activity
is sufficiently related to the employer's enterprise to find vicarious
liability, it is not a prerequisite s Similarly, the court noted that
the benefit to the employer from the employee's activity is a
relevant factor in determining liability, but it is not the sole
determinant of whether vicarious liability exists.5 9 The court left
open the question of whether benefit to the employer was a
necessary, but not sufficient factor, or a factor that was not even
necessary.
Beyond these two traditional factors, the court listed as
in sections 228 and 229
additional considerations every factor cited
60
of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.
In regard to the standards of Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 228 (1958), we think the following conduct of a servant may be
considered as indicative that it is within the scope of employment: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it
occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant
against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the
master.
52. Id. (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69,

at 459 (4th ed. 1971)).
53. 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973).

54. Id. at 762.
55. Id. at 763.
56. See id. at 764.
57. Id.

58. Id.
59. Id.

60.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§

228-229 (1958).
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(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment
if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the
or too little actuated by a
authorized time or space limits,
61
purpose to serve the master.
The court added the language of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, section 229:62
(1) To be within the scope of the employment, conduct must be
of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to
the conduct authorized. (2) In determining whether or not the
conduct, although not authorized, is nevertheless so similar to or
incidental to the conduct authorized as to be within the scope of
employment, the following matters of fact are to be considered:
(a) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such
servants; (b) the time, place and purpose of the act; (c) the
previous relations between the master and the servant; (d) the
extent to which the business of the master is apportioned
between different servants; (e) whether or not the act is outside
the enterprise of the master or, if within the enterprise, ha[s] not
been entrusted to any servant; (f) whether or not the master has
reason to expect that such an act will be done; (g) [the] similarity
in quality of the act done to the act authorized; (h) whether or
not the instrumentality by which the harm is done has been
furnished by the master to the servant; (i) the extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized
result; and (j) whether or not the act is seriously criminal.'
The court determined that Fruitleft the question of which acts
fall within the scope of employment up to the jury, with the
outcome dependent on the facts of each case. The court then
concluded that a jury looking at the facts in Luth and weighing the
above factors might decide that the employee's commuting from
work was within the scope of his employment, despite a widely
accepted "going-and-coming" rule that places commuting time
outside of the scope of employment.6 5 Justice Connor criticized
the majority, saying that "[t]he difficulty with the majority opinion
is that it drastically increases the tort liability of employers without

61. Luth, 507 P.2d at 764 n.14. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 228 (1958) for an identical list of factors. Note as significant, however, that the
Second Restatement introduces factors (a)-(d) by stating that "[c]onduct of a
servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if' each of the factors is
satisfied, whereas the Alaska Supreme Court labels the factors as "indicative" that
an employee's action is within the scope of employment.
62.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 229 (1958).

63. 507 P.2d at 764 n.14. Again, the language is identical to that in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 (1958).
64. 507 P.2d at 764.
65. Id at 765-66.
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providing any coherent or rationalizing principle by which to keep
such liability within reasonably predictable bounds."'66
In Williams v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,67 the Alaska
Supreme Court considered whether an intentionaltort might occur
within the scope of one's duties, thus subjecting the master to
respondeat superior liability." The case involved a union steward
who was alleged to have led an assault against Williams to settle a
labor dispute.69
The court reiterated the factors identified in Luth, this time
calling them useful "guidelines" in determining whether the assault
occurred within the scope of the steward's duties.7' The court
reasoned that respondeat superior liability covers both negligent
and intentional torts, if they occur within the scope of employment.7 '
The court held that because (1) the steward acted to resolve
a perceived grievance of his members, (2) his acts occurred within
authorized time and space limits, (3) his use of threats and force
was not unexpectable given his position and (4) he was motivated,
at least in part, by a desire to serve what he regarded as the
purposes of his union,72 he was acting within the scope of his
duties, and thus respondeat superior liability might attach to the
union.
In light of these cases, the Samaritan74 court announced that
Alaska had adopted a "flexible, multi-factored test"'75 as an
alternative to the "overly technical 'control' approach."76 This
multi-factored test is apparently that applied in Luth and Williams.
Significantly though, Samaritan is the first case in which the court

66. Id. at 770 (Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

67.
68.
69.
70.

650 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1982).
See id. at 348 n.9.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 349.

71. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 245 (1958)("A master
is subject to liability for the intended tortious harm by a servant ... by an act

done in connection with the servant's employment, although the act was
unauthorized, if the act was not unexpectable in view of the duties of the
servant.")). But cf. Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133,141 (Alaska 1972)(noting that
"[the rule of respondeat superior ... is limited to requiring an enterprise to bear
the loss incurred as a result of the employee's negligence"(emphasis added)).
72. Williams, 650 P.2d at 350. In fact, the court noted that the steward could
have had no personal motives for his actions. Id.
73. Id. at 350-51.
74. 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990).
75. Id at 346.
76. Id.
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found that respondeat superior liability might be possible for an
employee's sexual misconduct, even though sexual misconduct
clearly
is not motivated at all by any desire to serve the employ77
er.
Thus the court in Samaritantook advantage of the door that
had been left open by its post-Fruitdecisions but never used: that
the benefit to the employer from the employee's activity is a
relevant factor in determining liability, but it is not the sole
determinant.78 The employee's motivation to serve is merely one
of several guidelines to be considered in determining whether
respondeat superior liability is possible.79
Interestingly, though, the Samaritan court refused to rule that
motivation to serve the employer was irrelevant. Rather, the court
expanded the definition of "motivation to serve," determining that
the "motivation to serve" test was satisfied when the "tortious
conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the employee's
legitimate work activities."80 In its attempt to justify its position,
the Samaritan majority seems to confuse the meaning of section
228(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency81 (and hence one
of its own Luth factorsS), which provides that the employee's act
is not within the scope of employment if it is "different in kind
from that authorized."'
The majority reasons that because an
employee "is rarely authorized to commit a tort, [to give the
provision meaning, we] therefore construe this provision to mean
only that the act which leads to the tortious behavior cannot be
different in kind from acts the employee is authorized to perform
in furtherance of the employer's enterprise."' What the majority
ignores is that its interpretation essentially renders meaningless the

77. See Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344,350-54 (Alaska 1990)
(Moore, J., dissenting). In his strong dissent, Justice Moore writes, "There is no
reasonable interpretation under which [the therapist's] sexual misconduct possibly
could benefit Samaritan." lId at 350 (footnote omitted).
78. Luth v. Rogers & Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761, 764 (Alaska 1973)
(citing Gossett v. Sinonson, 411 P.2d 277, 279 (Or. 1966)).
79. Williams, 650 P.2d at 349 n.10 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 228 (1958)).
80. Samaritan,791 P.2d at 348. Cf W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 506 & n.48 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988)
(When the employee "acts from purely personal motives.., in no way connected
with the employer's interests, he is considered in the ordinary case to have
departed from his employment, and the master is not liable."(footnote omitted)).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (1958).

82. See Luth, 507 P.2d at 764.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (1958).
84. Samaritan,791 P.2d at 348 (emphasis added).
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"different in kind" condition of the Restatement, while a perfectly
consistent interpretation is readily apparent: respondeat superior
liability is meant to apply to an employee's negligent acts and
those intentional acts that are not "different in kind," such as the
court found in Williams. Justice Moore questions what the majority
views as the authorized action giving rise to sexual misconduct and
points out that "it is just false that [the therapist's] sexual misconduct arose out of psychotherapy."86
Justice Moore takes issue with the majority's statement "that
it could reasonably be concluded that the resulting sexual conduct
was 'incidental' to the therapy,"' claiming that even under the
weakened "motivation to serve" test, "respondeat superior liability
should not apply because therapist-patient sex is not 'reasonably
incidental' to psychotherapy." 8 For Justice Moore, "[s]exual
misconduct is not an improper method of carrying out the authority
granted to a therapist; rather, it constitutes an intentional abuse of
that authority for personal gratification." 9 Finally, in his dissent,
Justice Moore considers the rationale for respondeat superior
liability discussed in Fruit and referenced by the majority in
Samaritan. The Fruit court stated that one of the rationales for
respondeat superior was "to include in the costs of operation
inevitable losses to third persons incident to carrying on an
enterprise, and thus distribute the burden among those benefitted
85. The court seemed to suggest this in Fruit, noting that "[t]he rule of
respondeat superior ...is limited to requiring an enterprise to bear the loss
incurred as a result of the employee's negligence." Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d
133, 141 (Alaska 1972) (emphasis added).
86. Samaritan,791 P.2d at 352 (Moore, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 348 (footnote omitted).
88. Id. at 350-51 (Moore, J., dissenting). Note that just six months after St.
Paul Fire, the Alaska Supreme Court itself found that a gynecologist's sexual
assault of a patient did not result from medical treatment. D.D. v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 905 P.2d 1365, 1368 (Alaska 1995) (ruling that "[the gynecologist] did not
injure [the victim] by treating her, he injured her during the time he was supposed
to be treating her"). In so reasoning, the court found that the gynecologist's acts
were "outside of the traditional scope of malpractice." Id. at 1370. In its dubious
attempt to distinguish the case from Samaritan, the court noted only that a
therapist's mishandling of the "transference phenomenon" was within the scope
of malpractice. Id. at 1369. Interestingly, it was the finding that the assault here
did not constitute medical malpractice that enabled the victim to pursue a claim
under the building owner's insurance policy, which explicitly excluded claims
arising out of medical treatment. Id. at 1366. Note that the court's decision in
D.D. involved only the building owner's liability and not that of the assailant. It
therefore leaves unanswered the question of how Alaska's own courts would view
St. Paul Fire.

89. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 354 (Moore, J., dissenting).
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by the enterprise."' As Justice Moore points out, "[t]herapistpatient sex.., is not an inevitable cost of mental health care. It
is a cost imposed by therapists who intentionally disregard the
standards of conduct of mental health professionals for personal
sexual gratification."'"
Following the Samaritan decision, the federal courts have
interpreted Alaska's law on "scope of employment" issues in a
variety of contexts not involving sexual misconduct. For example,
in 1992, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska
considered whether state officials who might not have complied
with an Alaska statute regarding the taping of phone conversations
were acting within the scope of their employment.' Although the
case was decided under federal law, the court, after finding that the
employees were acting within the scope of their employment,
implied that it would have made the same ruling under Alaska law.
In dicta, it referred to Samaritan and stated that "Alaska views
scope of employment liberally."'93
In Coon v. Fey,94 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit considered an Alaska case in which an IRS agent
allegedly prepared a false affidavit hoping to obtain information
from a third party that would be relevant for the collection of
Coon's delinquent taxes.9' The court quoted some of the Luth
factors and then stated that when "the alleged tortious conduct
'arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the employee's
legitimate work activities, the 'motivation to serve' test will have
been satisfied."' 96 The court also noted that under Alaska's
principles of respondeat superior, "an employer may be held liable
for both the negligent and intentional torts of its employees."97
Combining these rationales, the court found that the IRS agent was
acting within the scope of his employment.9"

90.
91.
92.
93.

Fruit,502 P.2d at 141.
Samaritan,791 P.2d at 354 (Moore, J., dissenting).
United States v. Cheely, 814 F. Supp. 1430, 1439-43 (D. Alaska 1992).
Id. at 1443 n.14 (citing Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 346-50).

94. 29 F.3d 631,1994 WL 283620 (9th Cir. (Alaska)) (unpublished disposition).

Note that unpublished dispositions are not precedential. 9TH Cm. R. 36-3 ("Any
disposition that is not an opinion or an order designated for publication under
Circuit Rule 36-5 shall not be regarded as precedent ...
95. Id at *:,.
96. Id. (quoting Samaritan,791 P.2d at 348).
97. Id at **2 (citing Williams v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 650 P.2d 343,34849 (Alaska 1982)).
98. Id
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In 1995, the Ninth Circuit considered another Alaska case
involving alleged torts by IRS employees.99 The court found the
employee's acts unquestionably within the scope of their employment and the appeal to be frivolous,"°° but not before noting that
in determining whether an act is within the scope of employment,
the court should look to three nonexclusive factors: (1) whether the
conduct is of the kind the employee is employed to perform; (2)
whether the conduct occurs substantially within the authorized time
and space limits; and (3) whether the conduct is actuated, at least
in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.''
The last Alaska case relevant to the St. Paul Fire decision is
actually a pre-Samaritancase from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Roelfs.' ° In
this case, which in many ways is the most similar to St. Paul Fire,
Allstate sought a declaratory judgment that it was "not liable to
defend or indemnify the Roelfs against any claims filed by" the
parent of two girls who were sexually abused in the Roelfs
household."° The Roelfs' homeowners insurance policy contained an exclusion for "bodily injury... intentionally caused by
an insured person."" The Roelfs stipulated that their son had
"willfully and intentionally committed various acts of sexual assault
and molestation .... ,"05
The court acknowledged that the "Alaska Supreme Court has
yet to interpret an intentional act exclusion"'" and that "when
interpreting an insurance policy Alaska looks to case law from
other jurisdictions construing similar provisions."'1 7 The court
then examined cases from various jurisdictions and drew several
conclusions about what Alaska law would have been had the
Alaska Supreme Court considered the issue: (1) Alaska would
infer intent to cause injury from sexual assault as a matter of

99. Rowen v. Elliott, 52 F.3d 334, 1995 WL 230347 (9th Cir. (Alaska))
(unpublished disposition).
100. Id. at **1-**2.
101. Id. at **1 (citing Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 347). These are the same factors
the court mentioned in Coon v. Fey, 29 F.3d 631,1994 WL 283620 at **1 (9th Cir.
(Alaska)) (unpublished disposition).
102. 698 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1987).
103. Id. at 816.
104. Id. at 817 (internal reference omitted).
105. Id. at 816 (internal reference omitted).
106. Id. at 820.
107. Id. (citing Stordahl v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 66
(Alaska 1977)).
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law;"~ (2) this conclusion comported "with the purpose of the
intentional acts exclusion clause, which is to 'prevent extending to
the insured a license to commit wanton and malicious acts"';"°9
(3) while a general rule is that "insurance contracts are construed
liberally against the insurer and doubtful language is resolved in
favor of the insured, [the] rule does not necessarily apply... when
the party urging a particular construction is not a party to the
contract";110 and (4) "most people would 'cringe' at the notion
that an insurance policy would provide coverage for bodily injury
caused by sexual assault ...."I 12 Based on these conclusions, the
court granted Allstate's motion.
This then, at the time that St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co. v. RH. came before the district court, was the legal landscape
in Alaska regarding the determination of whether a certain activity
fell within the scope of one's employment. Although the Alaska
state courts had significantly elaborated on the ability to find
liability for intentional acts and on the definition of "motivation to
serve," and although in the wake of Samaritan,the federal courts
had consistently cited it and applied its criteria, Roelfs was still
good law, and there was still enough question as to the state of
Alaska law for the district court to attempt certification of several
issues to the Alaska Supreme Court." However, the Alaska
Supreme Court declined to respond, and the district court followed
Roelfs." 4 This result seemed contrary to the widening breadth of
"scope of employment" evidenced by Samaritan, but St. PaulFire
was, after all, not a case of respondeat superior, but rather an
insurance case.

108. Id (citing, e.g., Linebaugh v. Berdish, 144 Mich. App. 750,376 N.W.2d 400,
405 (1985) (inferring intent to injure from a male's sexual assault of a fourteenyear-old girl); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Independent Sch. Dist., 355 N.W.2d 413,
416 (Minn. 1984) (inferring intent to cause bodily injury as a matter of law from
a teacher's sexual contacts with a student); Grange Ins. Ass'n v. Authier, 725 P.2d
642, 644 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (dicta) (inferring intent to harm a minor from

sexual assault as a matter of law)).
109. Id- at 820-21 (quoting Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Sipple, 255 N.W.2d 373, 375

(Minn. 1977)).
110. Id. at 817 (citing Starry v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 649 P.2d 937, 939
(Alaska 1982); Flexi-van Leasing Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 822 F.2d 854, 856

(9th Cir. 1987)).
111. 1d. at 818.
112. Id. at 822.
113. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.H., No. A90-042 Civ. (D. Alaska July
13, 1993).
114. Id
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Despite the similarities between respondeat superior liability
and an insurer's liability," it is worth noting that they are not the
same. Consider, for example, the Ninth Circuit's statement that
"[u]nder the vicarious liability exception to the general rule that
intentional acts are not covered by insurance policies, an insured
may receive coverage for the intentional acts of its agent when the
insured is vicariously as opposed to directly liable.'
B. The Law in Other States
"Most courts have found sexual molestation to be intentional
and excluded from insurance coverage as a matter of law."" 7
Most of the states specifically excluding intentional sexual acts from
insurance coverage have relied on judicial interpretation of public
policy, while others have codified the exclusion.
Those states in which the courts have determined that
insurance for sexual abuse is contrary to public'policy fall into two
groups. The first group finds sexual abuse uninsurable per se,
without specifically addressing the insurability of intentional acts
generally.'" The second group notes that insurance for any
intentional act is contrary to public policy, including sexual
abuse. 1 9
In the first group, for example, a federal district court in
Alabama stated that Alabama's "public policy demands the result"
that sexual abuse not be covered by insurance.'" It summarized
Alabama's vision of public policy by stating that "[a]ny other result
subsidizes the episodes of child sexual abuse of which its victims

115. Consider Williams and Samaritan, for example, as respondeat superior
cases and St. Paul Fire as an insurance case. Note that all three cases involve
shifting the liability for an intentional tort from the perpetrator of the tort to
someone else, whether an employer or an insurer.
116. Northern Ins. Co. v. Drake, 915 F.2d 1581, 1990 WL 142502, **1 (9th
Cir.(Cal.)) (unpublished disposition)(emphasis added).
117. Commercial Union Ins. Cos. v. Sky, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 249,253 (W.D. Ark.

1992) (citations omitted).

118. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Gates, 530 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Fore, 785 F. Supp. 947 (M.D. Ala. 1992);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jarvis, 393 S.E.2d 489 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); see also St. Paul
Ins. Co. v. Cromeans, 771 F. Supp. 349, 352-53 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (noting that all
contracts insuring against damage from sexual misconduct are void as against
public policy).

119. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Cohen, 881 P.2d 1001 (Wash. 1994);
Atlantic Employers Ins. Co. v. Chartwell Manor Sch., 655 A.2d 954 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 660 A.2d 66 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995).

120. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Fore, 785 F. Supp. 947, 956 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
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complain .... ,121 The court added its view of the argument that
sexual abuse could occur in the line of a teacher's duties, stating
that it was "obvious that sexual abuse is not an activity concerned
with education.... ""
Georgia looks at child molestation as "one of those acts which
is 'so extreme that public policy does not permit [it] to be insured.""' Minnesota views sexual and physical abuse as acts that
"are not covered as a matter of public policy."' 24
The second group includes states such as New Jersey, which
believes that "[i]ntentional acts of the insured are normally not
'
covered by insurance policies as a matter of public policy." 5
Pennsylvania agrees that "it is against the public policy of this
Commonwealth to provide insurance coverage for intentional
acts."' In Washington, there is a general rule that "it is against
public policy to insure against liability arising from the intentional
infliction of injury on the person of another."'"
States in each group have considered whether to require
evidence of intent to cause harm in child sexual abuse cases or
allow intent to be inferred. A Wisconsin district court pointed out
that of the fifteen other states that had considered the issue,
as early as
fourteen had adopted the "inferred intent" approach
130
29
To these states may be added Alaska, Arizona,
1989.1
Maine,'35
Kentucky,'33 Louisiana,3
Illinois, 3 ' Kansas,
121. Id.
122. Id. at 948 (citations omitted).
123. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jarvis, 393 S.E.2d 489, 490 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)(citing
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Huie, 666 F. Supp. 1402, 1405 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
124.- National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Gates, 530 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995)(citation omitted).
125. Atlantic Employers Ins. Co. v. Chartwell Manor Seh., 655 A.2d 954, 957
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
126. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 660 A.2d 66, 68 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (citation omitted).
127. American Home Assurance Co. v. Cohen, 881 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Wash.
1994) (citation omitted).
128. Whitt v. DeLeu, 707 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 & n.4 (W.D. Wis. 1989)(listing
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Washington, [Wisconsin] and
West Virginia).
129. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F. Supp. 815, 820 (D. Alaska 1987).
130. See State v. Hamilton, 868 P.2d 986, 990 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
131. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Watters, 644 N.E.2d 492, 496-97 (II.
1995).
App. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 649 N.E.2d 425 (M11.
132. See Troy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 789 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (D. Kan. 1992).
133. See Goldsmith v. Physicians Ins. Co., 890 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Ky. Ct. App.
1994).
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Nevada,'

Ohio, 4'

New

Jersey, 3 '

New

Pennsylvania, 43

York,

9

North

South DakoOregon,"
Carolina,'"
ta'44 and Texas.' 45
Thus, in these states, even in the absence of a stated public
policy against insuring for sexual abuse or intentional acts generally, an insurer can usually avoid liability for a claim arising out of
sexual abuse merely by incorporating a standard intentional acts
exclusion into the insurance policy. The abuser's intent will be

inferred. Note, however, that this question is not dispositive in St.
Paul Fire because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the

policy covered intentional acts.'

When a policy covers inten-

tional acts, it is not important whether the sexual abuser has actual

subjective intent to cause harm or has intent inferred by the court.
California is representative of the states that have addressed

insurability of intentional acts by statute. The California Court of
Appeals has stated that the California Insurance Code "reflects the

'fundamental public policy of denying coverage for willful

wrongs.""' 4 7 California courts have said that Section 533 of the

134. See Belsom v. Bravo, 658 So. 2d 1304, 1306 (La. Ct. App.), reconsideration
denied, 659 So. 2d 737 (La. 1995).
135. See Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 568 A.2d 1100, 1101 (Me.
1990).
136. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. D.T.S., 867 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Mo. Ct.

App. 1993).
137. See State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Grover, No. CV-S-87-659, LDG, 1990 WL
208908, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 15, 1990).
138. See Atlantic Employers Ins. Co. v. Tots & Toddlers Pre-School Day Care
Ctr., Inc., 571 A.2d 300, 304 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
139. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589 N.E.2d 365, 369 (N.Y. 1992).
140. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Abemethy, 445 S.E.2d 618, 620 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1994).
141. See Ozog v. Nationwide Ins. Co., Nos. 66421, 66428, 1994 WL 631200, at
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1994).
142. See American Cas. Co. v. A.D., 885 P.2d 726, 729 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
143. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Craig, No. CIV.A. 95-0503, 1995 WL
672397, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1995).
144. See American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Purdy, 483 N.W.2d 197, 201 (S.D.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 870 (1992).
145. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 880 S.W.2d 129, 140 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996).
146. St. Paul Fire, 55 F.3d at 1425.
147. Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 704
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689, 694
n.8 (Cal. 1991)). Section 533 of the California Insurance Code (West 1994)
provides in part that "[a]n insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful [sic]
act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or
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Insurance Code is "an implied exclusionary clause which by statute
is to be read into all insurance policies."' 48
On the other hand, several states have found that allowing
insurance for intentional acts, sometimes even sexual misconduct,
does not violate public policy. In Tennessee, for example, it is not
against public policy for an insurer to cover a doctor's sexual
molestation of his patient. 49 The courts in New Mexico have
"refused to extend the public policy prohibiting insurance coverage
for intentionally produced injuries to unintended consequences of
intentional acts"' (refusing to infer the abuser's intent to harm
the victim).
The courts in Illinois still seem to be struggling with the issue,
for although Illinois courts have found a public policy forbidding
insurance coverage for sexual abuse of a child,' the Illinois
Supreme Court "decline[d] to adopt the public policy against
insuring for damages resulting from intentional
misconduct" in a
52
case involving a retaliatory discharge.
Indiana's courts have ruled that the reasons for the public
policy against allowing insurance for intentional acts do not exist
when (1) the insured was not induced to engage in the unlawful
conduct by reliance on insurability, (2) allowing insurance coverage
would not induce future similar unlawful conduct, (3) it does not
appear that the insurance was obtained in contemplation of
violation of the law, (4) coverage does not allow the wrongdoer
unjustly to benefit from his wrong and (5) it is not the insured who
will benefit, but the innocent victim." Where these five factors

of the insured's agents or others." See also N. D. Cent. Code § 26.1-32-04 (1995)
("An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the willful act of the insured, but the
insurer is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured or of the insured's
agents or others.").
148. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 205
Cal. Rptr. 460, 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
149. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Torpoco, 879 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tenn.
1994) (stating that a stronger public policy than not insuring intentional acts is the
policy "that ambiguities in insurance policies are to be construed against the
drafter of the policy").
150. Baker v. Armstrong, 744 P.2d 170, 172 (N.M. 1987).
151. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Watters, 644 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994).
152. Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 395, 401 (MI1.
1994).
153. Collins v. Covenant Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.E.2d 1190, 1197 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992) (citing Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kimbly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982)), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 644 N.E.2d 116 (Ind.1994).
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are satisfied, insurance for intentional acts is consistent with public
policy.15
IV. APPRAISAL OF THE NINTH CiRcUrr'S DECISION IN ST.
PAUL FIRE

As the Ninth Circuit is quick to point out, St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. marketed the professional liability policy to
Big Brothers as a child molestation policy.'"5 The Ninth Circuit
noted that under Alaska law, it must consider both the language of
the policy and any representations made in selling it.56 The
insurance company's agent, Jack Kirby made the following
representations in a memorandum:
Most of you are aware of the growing number of lawsuits
alleging child molesting being brought against the Big Brother/Big Sister agencies and their officers and directors ....
Professional liability insurance with general liability
insurance is the only certain method of insuring against child
molesting claims. Regardless of how the suit is filed and what
allegationsare made, the combination of those two policies will
ensure proper coverage.

The insureds in the general liability and professional
liability policy are: 1. The agency. 2. The officers and directors.
3. The employees of the agency. 4. The Big Brother/Big Sister
volunteer, but they are not covered for illegal acts. The other
insureds do have coverage for illegal acts."
The first paragraph of this memo clearly points out that Kirby
and Big Brothers were thinking about child molestation claims at
the time of contracting. The second paragraph again discusses child
molestation claims and at least strongly implies that such claims will
be covered under the policy. The third paragraph clearly suggests
that the executive director has coverage for illegal acts. The Ninth
Circuit correctly noted that a lay person would have expected
Morecoverage for criminal acts including child sexual abuse.'
over, Alaska law requires that an insurance contract be given the

154. Id.
155. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.H.; K.W., 55 F.3d 1420, 1422-23 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 674 (1995).
156. hd at 1423 (stating that because "a policyholder's reasonable expectations
of coverage are to control .... [a]n insurer will in fact be bound by its representations to the extent that they form, with the policy itself, the expectations of a
reasonable policyholder") (quoting INA Life Ins. Co. v. Brundin, 533 P.2d 236,242
(Alaska 1975).
157. Id. at 1422-23 (first emphasis added).
158. Id. at 1423.
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meaning a lay person would have expected."5 9 As the Ninth
Circuit points out, "employees are explicitly not excluded from
coverage for illegal acts, and it is clear that sexual abuse was the
illegal act... in contemplation of the parties. ' 60
The policy itself, without Kirby's memo, also can be called
ambiguous. The policy stated in part:
The named insured shall include any individual or organization named in this coverage summary. It also includes any
partner, executive officer, director, stockholder or employee
working for you within the scope of their duties. There is no
coverage for the individual Big Brother and Big Sister if the
event is in violation of any federal, state, or local law. This
specific exclusion of violations of law does not apply to other
insureds named in this agreement. 61
The last sentence again seemingly suggests that the executive
director is insured for any illegal acts he might commit. What
exactly is the "specific exclusion of violations of law"? When
considered in light of the sentence before it, the language begins to
take on a different meaning. This previous sentence states that
there is "no coverage for the individual Big Brother and Big Sister
if the event is in violation of law." This would seem to suggest that
the "specific exclusion" is only for actions taken by an individual
Big Brother or Big Sister. Combining this with the last clause that
the "specific exclusion" does not apply to directors would suggest
only that the directors are covered for actions taken by the
individual Big Brother or Big Sister.
This construction means that the last sentence of the quoted
portion of the policy would not specifically insure the directors for
illegal acts, but also that there is no exclusion for such acts. Thus
the whole issue of coverage for illegal acts by a director would
collapse down to the second sentence, that directors are covered
when "working for [Big Brothers] within the scope of their duties."
This is essentially the construction that St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. urged on the court, 62 but it is not the construction
that the court of appeals used.' 63
The Ninth Circuit points out that "the most that could be said
is that the policy terms were ambiguous,"' 164 and this would

159. Serradell v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 843 P.2d 639, 641 (Alaska
1992).
160. St. Paul Fire, 55 F.3d at 1423.
161. Reply Brief of Appellants at 9, St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.H., 55
F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-35746).
162. St. Paul Fire, 55 F.3d at 1422.
163. Id,
164. Id at 1423.
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generally suggest that the policy should be construed against the
insurer." s However, as the district court pointed out in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Roelfs,'" this rule "does not necessarily apply
... when the party urging a particular construction is not a party
to the contract,"' 6 as is the case in St. Paul Fire.
The Ninth Circuit looked at a landscape in which Alaska law
on the issues of sexual misconduct and actions within the scope of
employment was just beginning to take shape. However, there
were a great number of cases outside Alaska that might have been
persuasive.
A California Court of Appeals found in a similar case that "as
a matter of law sexual abuse is unrelated to a teacher's employment and hence not within the coverage provided by the policy. ,)1 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dealing with
the same issue noted that sexually abusive acts "were not of the
kind [a school employee] was employed to perform" and "were not
motivated [even in] part by a purpose to serve the employer."' 69
These out-of-state cases aside, the issue of whether McQuade was
operating within the scoRe of his employment collided with
Samaritan70 and Cheely,' which still stood in the way of St.
Paul Fire.
Although public policy arguments are often somewhat
nebulous, since it is always possible to find policies on both sides
of an issue, in a case like St. Paul Fire they beg to be considered.
The two main arguments relevant here are the following: (1) to
hold insurance companies financially liable for the intentional acts
of their insureds is to give a license to the insureds to engage in

165. See, e.g., D.D. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 905 P.2d 1365, 1368 (Alaska 1995)
(stating that "where a clause in an insurance policy is ambiguous in the sense that
it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court accepts that
interpretation which most favors the insured.")(quoting Bering Straight Sch. Dist.
v. R.L.I. Ins. Co., 873 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Alaska 1994)).
166. 698 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1987).
167. ld. at 817.
168. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Analisa N., 263 Cal. Rptr. 61, 61 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989).
169. Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958, 967
(Mass. 1990).
170. 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990) (holding that respondeat superior liability could
exist for an employee's sexual misconduct).
171. 814 F. Supp. 1430 (D. Alaska 1992) (holding that Alaska interprets scope
of employment broadly).
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those acts, and Q to do otherwise is to deny compensation to
innocent victims.
One commentator, George L. Priest, considers the basic
premises underlying insurance, concluding that "[s]exual abuse of
children is not the form of probabilistic loss for which the insurance
function is appropriate."'
Essentially, insurance is designed to
cover risk. 74 The concept of risk becomes somewhat vacuous in
the context of intentional acts.7 Priest also considers "judicial
efforts to force coverage of uninsurable risks of this nature
[to be]
1 76
short-sighted, reducing the effective insurance levels."'
A federal court in Kansas believes that "the expansion of
insurance coverage to protect the insured from damages arising out
of the sexual molestation of children is beyond the realm of public
policy."'"
In a California case, a concurring opinion agrees,
reasoning that "a teacher should not be rewarded with insurance
coverage for a wholly unprofessional course of conduct arising out
of his sexual molestation of a student."' 78 These sentiments
capture both the supposed deterrent effect and a punitive effect.
The deterrent effect is supposed to arise because an individual
without an insurance policy will be less likely to engage in an
intentional tort like sexual molestation if the individual's own
assets, rather than an insurance company's, might be at risk. The
punitive effect is based on the same rationale. If an individual
engages in willful malfeasance, that individual should risk a greater
personal loss. This actually amounts to a non-enrichment argument
m some circumstances, for instance when an individual sets fire to
his own home to collect insurance proceeds. Such an individual
should be excluded from collecting.
Of course, "public policy

172. See, eg., Gary L. Fontana & Anthony J. Barron, Insurance Coveragefor
IntentionalActs,in INSURANCE CLAIMS AND COVERAGE LITIGATION 1993, at 3-4

(PLI Order No. A4-4415, 1993) ("In some instances, a plaintiff's only source of
recovery may be the defendant's insurer.... However, if insurance is allowed
even for intentional acts, those who engage in intentional wrongful conduct will
escape from liability for the damages they cause and the deterrent function of tort
law will be sacrificed.").
173. George L. Priest, The CurrentInsurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L. J. 1521, 1572 n.198 (1987).
174. In the insurance context, risk may be defined as "the chance of loss."
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1159 (3d College ed. 1988).

175.
176.
177.
178.

An intentional act would seem to involve a certainty, rather than a chance.
Priest, supra note 173, at 1572 n.198.
Troy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 789 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (D. Kansas 1992).
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 357 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1992)(Sills, PJ., concurring), rev'd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 792 (Cal.
1993).
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considerations that preclude insurance coverage for self-inflicted
injury lose a great deal of their force in the context of insurance for
tortious liability to innocent third parties." '79 Even in cases that
at first glance do not appear to involve enrichment from one's own
tortious acts, however, the question remains: Do we wish to
protect the tortfeasor's own assets by allowing insurance for such
acts?
V.

CONCLUSION

Cases such as St. Paul Fire raise numerous issues. Insurance
companies base their premiums on the extent of coverage in the
policies, and as the Nevada Supreme Court noted, "[t]he average
law-abiding professional would not desire to pay more so that the
policy would cover their own criminal or intentionally tortious
conduct."' ° The court did not ask, however, if the average lawabiding professional might be philanthropic enough to pay a higher
premium to compensate the innocent victims of heinous acts. In
any case, if tort liability is expanded because of the intentional acts
of certain individuals, it remains true that everyone's liability is
increased in the form of higher insurance premiums and reduced
availability of insurance.
Alaska's law on the issue of insurability for an individual's
intentional acts of sexual abuse remains unsettled, for Alaska's own
courts have not met the issue head-on. Nevertheless, those seeking
guidance must now turn to the decision of the Ninth Circuit and
acknowledge that sexual abuser insurance currently exists in
Alaska. An individual may protect his own assets from his victims
by purchasing the appropriate type of insurance."8 '
This policy is abhorrent and should be eradicated when
Alaska's own courts consider the issue. There exist alternatives to
the straight tort system, such as the establishment of a victim's
compensation fund to offset the damages to victims who are unable
to recover from their abusers. Such a fund might be financed by
imposing a fee on the sale of insurance policies, for example. This
fee would be imposed in lieu of the increase in insurance premiums
or the reduced availability of insurance that naturally follows from
the expansion of the insurance companies' liability following the

179. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 941, 948
(N.D. IM.1988), rev'd on other grounds, 883 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989).
180. Rivera v. Nevada Medical Liab. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 71, 74 (Nev. 1991).
181. Because sexual abuse remains illegal, the individual would still face the
criminal justice system, albeit with the higher burden of proof placed on the state.
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Ninth Circuit's decision."8 Unlike the insurance "solution,"
however, the fund would not insulate the abuser from personal
liability. Alaska's courts must not allow the Ninth Circuit's
decision to remain the law of Alaska.
Ward S. Connolly

182. The imposition of such a fee, of course, would also be partially passed
along to consumers in the form of higher premiums.

